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INTRODUCTION
The right of the railroad and the traveling public to use
the railroad and the highway respectively are co-ordinate
and equal. Each should exercise reasonable care so as not to
interfere unnecessarily with the other.'
The purpose of this article will be to analyze the manner and
extent to which the courts of Ohio have construed the above men-
tioned language, thereby molding and shaping the rights and duties
of the particular parties involved in a railroad collision.
THE DuTY OF THE RAILROAD TO WARN
DUTY TO GIVE A WARNNG FROM THE TRAm
While it is true that railroad crossing law is largely judge-made
law, the Ohio legislature has set up statutory standards controlling
the duty of a railroad to give warnings from its trains. Ohio Rev.
Code § 4963.25 specifies that a railroad must keep a headlight shin-
ing on its locomotive at night.2 Section 4955.32 of the Ohio Revised
Code provides that the engineer of a train shall sound the bell and
whistle when approaching within 80 to 100 rods of a public crossing,
or a private crossing the view of which is obstructed. Violation of
either safety statute constitutes negligence per se.3 The statute clear-
ly absolves the railroad from the duty of giving a warning at a pri-
vate crossing which is not obstructed.4 The actual legal problems
arising from this statute are few; the vexing problem is largely one
of factual proof. For example, it is quite common for some witnesses
to testify that the railroad never blew a whistle; other witnesses,
that they did not hear a whistle; yet, more witnesses, that a whistle
was actually blown.
A jury issue is not necessarily presented merely because there
is a conflict in testimony as to whether a railroad whistle was either
heard or blown. For negative testimony to have probative effect, it
must be affirmatively shown that such witnesses both must have
been in a position to hear the whistle and must have been suf-
ficiently attentive.5 If such facts are not shown, the question is de-
ICincimati v. Luckey, 153 Ohio St. 247, 91 NE. 2d 477 (1950); Pitts-
burgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry. v. Maurer, 21 Ohio St. 421 (1871).
2 If the train is engaged in interstate commerce then Title 45, §22 et seq.
of the US. Code, which provides for such a light, pre-empts the field of
state legislation. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Rd., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
3 B. & 0. Rd. v. Joseph, 112 F. 2d 518 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 312
U.S. 682 (1940).
4 It has been held that, where there was a clear view of 2,000 feet from
a private crossing, that such a crossing could not be deemed obstructed.
Burnett v. Erie Rd., 39 Ohio L. Abs. 621 (1944).
5 Hicks v. B. & 0. Rd., 160 Ohio St. 307, 116 N.E. 2d 307 (1953); Patton v.
Penna. Rd., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E. 2d 597 (1939); Carter v. Penna. Rd., 172 F.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
cided in the railroad's favor as a matter of law.6 The court's tendency
to find that such negative testimony has no probative value seems to
be proportionate, to a certain extent, to the amount of positive
credible testimony showing that the whistle was blown.7
Actually, a plaintiff cannot rely upon the railroad's negligence
in failing to blow the whistle unless the plaintiff was in a position
where he could have heard the whistle if it was blown,8 since under
such circumstances the railroad's negligence is not a proximate
cause of the accident.
DUTY TO Gmw ADDITIONAL WARNINGS
The problem proffered in this area is, what type of warning from
the ground must the railroad give to travelers approaching and
crossing the right-of-way? Section 4955.33 of the Ohio Revised Code
reads in part:
At all points where its road crosses a public road at a
common grade, each company shall erect a sign with large
and distinct letters thereon to give notice of the proximity
of the railroad and warn persons to be on the lookout for
the locomotive.
It should be noted that this statute requires that only one sign
be erected. However, the sign must be so situated as to be visible
to third parties from either side of the crossing;9 violation of this
statute constitutes negligence per se;' 0 thus, if the sign is not erected
or is not kept in reasonable repair, the railroad is negligent per se.1'
In such a case, plaintiff must affirmatively establish that the sign's
defective condition was the proximate cause of the accident' 2
The above-mentioned statute has been implemented by Ohio
Rev. Code § 4907.49 which provides that the Public Utilities Com-
mission may require a watchman or additional warning devices at
2d 521 (8th Cir. 1949). Of course, if witnesses were in a position to hear
and did not hear a railroad signal, such evidence is properly admitted. H. V.
Ry. v. Wykle, 122 Ohio St. 391, 171 N.E. 860 (1930).
6 For example, it has been held that negative testimony may have no
probative value whatsoever where witnesses who present such negative tes-
timony are admittedly indoors one-half mile away from the crossing. Hicks
v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 5, supra.
7 Carter v. Penna. Rd., 172 F. 2d 521 (6th Cir. 1949); Patton v. Penna. Rd.,
see note 5, supra.
8 lcsman v. N.Y.C. Rd., 85 Ohio App. 47, 87 N. 2d 829 (1948); Kramers
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 60 Ohio App. 556, 22 N. 2d 227 (1929).
9 Reed v. Erie Rd., 134 Ohio St. 31, 15 N.. 2d 637 (1938).
1O Patterson v. Penna. Rd., 26 Ohio L. Abs. 467 (1938).
11 Cobb v. Busbey, 152 Ohio St. 336, 89 N.. 2d 466 (1949),
12 Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently held that where a
driver of an automobile drives into the rear section of an engine, a passenger
in the automobile cannot recover since defendant's negligence in not maintain-
ing a sign was not a proximate cause of the accident. Cobb v. Busbey, see note
11, supra.
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any crossing if in the opinion of the Commission the crossing is
dangerous. Violation of this section is also said to be negligence
per se.1 3 But it has been held that municipalities cannot require
a railroad to erect gates or to supply additional warning devices;14
a municipality can only require that the crossing be illuminated by
a street-light device.15
Sections 4955.33 and 4907.49 of the Ohio Revised Code have
been construed by the Ohio court as merely requiring a minimum
standard. It is quite possible that a railroad can be negligent in
failing to provide proper warnings, even though it has complied
with the above mentioned statutes. The problem manifests itself in
the following manner: In the absence of an order of the Public
Utilities Commission can a railroad be deemed negligent in failing to
provide more than one sign at any particular railroad crossing? The
Ohio Supreme Court has answered this question in the affirmative.
If a crossing is "especially dangerous," i.e. "extra hazardous" or if
there exist "special circumstances," which made additional warning
devices necessary for the public safety, the railroad must provide
additional warning devices above and beyond the statutory re-
quirements.16
The classic problem then arises. What is an extra hazardous
crossing? Even a cursory analysis of this phrase compels one to con-
clude that no clear-cut and axiomatic set of rules can be established.
As in the case of judicial construction of any ambiguous legal test,
the evolution of the structural pattern must be piecemeal, case by
case. Such has been the situation in Ohio. However, it is possible to
predict with a certain degree of accuracy the boundaries of this legal
standard.
The Ohio court has rather uniformly held as a matter of law
that in the open country a railroad is responsible for shrubs, weeds
and other natural obstructions on its right-of-way; conversely, the
railroad is not responsible for shrubs, weeds and other natural ob-
structions situated in the open country which are not on its right-
of-way. Such being the case, as a matter of law the railroad does not
have to provide additional warning devices on the basis that these
obstructions not on the right-of-way solely constitute an extra
hazardous crossing.' 7 The theoretical justification for this rule is
rested on the premise that the railroad has no control over these
13 Erie Rd. v. Stewart, 40 F. 2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S.
843 (1930).
14H-axgh v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Ry., 25 Ohio L. Abs. 123 (1937).
Isbid.
16Woodworth v. Rd. Co., 149 Ohio St. 543, 80 NZE. 2d 142 (1948); Railroad
Co. v. Kistler, 66 Ohio St 326, 64 NE. 130 (1902); Cleveland C.C. & ILR. v.
Schneider, 45 Ohio St. 678, 17 N.E. 321 (1888).
17 Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Yeley, 165 F. 2d 375 (6th Cir. 1947).
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obstacles and consequently should not have to take such things into
consideration.' The same reasoning has been applied to man-made
obstacles not on the railroad's right-of-way in the open country.19
At the other extreme the courts have just as uniformly held
that in a populous municipality where the crossing is very heavily
traveled, the question as to whether the crossing is extra-hazardous
is singularly for the jury.20 The question is submitted to the jury
even though the obstruction be man-made or natural and is not
located upon the railroad's right-of-way; yet, it is true that the rail-
road has no control over these obstacles. The court, however, dis-
regards this argument on the theory that the crossing is only extra-
hazardous because of its use by the railroad. There has been some
language in the cases to indicate that the boundaries of a munici-
pality determine whether a crossing is located within the open
country.21 It is submitted that this phraseology is more loose than
definitive; in fact, it has been expressly held that a crossing within
the municipal boundaries of villages and great cities can still be con-
sidered as situated in the open country.2 Further even though some
courts tend to define an extra-hazardous crossing as one which is
within a municipality, it does not necessarily follow that a crossing
can only be extra-hazardous if it is within the boundaries of a mu-
nicipality a crossing in the open country which intersects a heavily
traveled road may be considered extra-hazardous especially if the
road has a marked change of grade.23 While it has been held that
weather conditions in themselves are insufficient to render a cross-
ing extra-hazardous, 24 it is reasonable to conclude that temporary
weather conditions, at sometime, may be a factor in determining
whether a particular crossing was at a given time extra-hazardous. 25
The Ohio cases may perhaps be reconciled on the theory that
18 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Lacey v. N.Y.C. Rd., 54 Ohio
L. Abs. 417, 85 N.E. 2d 540 (1948).
19 Jollay v. Penna. Rd., 34 Ohio L. Abs. 514, 38 N.E. 2d 204 (1941).
20 Railway Co. v. Schneider, see note 16, supra; Weaver v. Railway Co.,
76 Ohio St. 164, 81 N.E. 180 (1907); Icsman v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 8, supra;
D. & T. Elec. Ry. v. Bradford, 19 Ohio App. 266 (1923).
21 C.C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kuhl, 123 Ohio St. 552, 558, 176 N. 222, 224
(1931); Loos v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 60 Ohio App. 527, 533, 22 NE. 2d 217,
(1938).
22 Kelting v. C. & 0. Rd., 50 Ohio App. 521, 199 N.E. 87 (1934); Clark v.
B. & 0. Rd., 196 F. 2d 206 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 830 (1952);
Carter v. Penna. Rd., see note 5, supra.
23 Although the issue of an extra-hazardous crossing arose on the question
of speed, the principle remains unaltered. N.Y.C. Rd. v. Sentle, 54 Ohio
App. 488, 8 NE. 2d 149 (1936).
24 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., 136 Ohio St 203, 104 N.E. 2d 822 (1940); Penna.
Rd. v. Stegaman, 22 F. 2d 69 (6th Cir. 1927); B. & 0. Rd. v. Reeves, 10 F. 2d
329 (6th Cir. 1926).
2S Hicks v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 5, supra.
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obstructions in the open country off the railroad's right-of-way and
weather conditions are not in themselves the sole bases for a de-
termination that a particular crossing is extra-hazardous. Where
there is additional evidence of extra-hazardous conditions, i.e., a
very heavily traveled highway, an extreme change in the highway
grade, location within a populous community, then the court may
admit these same weather conditions and obstructions as evidence
of negligence.26
A matter of practical importance is presented by the rule
requiring the facts, which would establish extra-hazardous condi-
tions, to be pleaded in the plaintiff's petition or complaint.27 Yet,
assuming that the extra-hazardous condition has been properly
pleaded, it is reversible error to submit to the jury the question as
to whether the crossing was adequately protected by additional
warning signs, when there is no evidence of extra-hazardous con-
ditions.28 Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that, depend-
ing upon the individual circumstances, a crossing may be extra-
hazardous as to some travelers while not extra-hazardous to others.
Plaintiff must, therefore, establish that the crossing is extra-haz-
ardous as to his particular accident. It is insufficient to show
merely that the crossing is generally extra-hazardous. 29
What effect will a train occupying the crossing have upon the
duty of the railroad to provide additional warning signs? The Ohio
court has adopted what is termed the "pre-emption doctrine." It
may be aptly illustrated by this cogent statement of the Ohio Su-
preme Court:3 0
Where a railroad train is rightfully occupying its track at
a highway intersection, the presence of the train is ade-
quate notice to a traveler that the crossing is pre-empted.
Consequently, no additional signs, signals or warnings are
required of the railroad company and negligence cannot
be imputed to it by reason of their absence.
At first blush, this rule may seem rather harsh, but subjected
to analytical inspection, the theory is quite justifiable. Since the
only purpose of signs and additional warnings is to provide notice,
if the train is occupying the crossing, notice is then given to trav-
elers by its presence. What effect will the "pre-emption doctrine"
have upon a violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4955.33 which provides
26 Gibbins v. B. & 0. Rd., 92 Ohio App. 87, 109 N.E. 2d 511 (1952); Iesnan
v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 7, supra; Loos v. Wheeling & LE Ry., see note 21,
supra.27 Railroad v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Clark v. B. & 0. Rd., see note
22, supra.
2SLacey v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 18, supra; Haugh v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton Ry., see note 14, supra.
29 Tanzi v. Rd. Co., 155 Ohio St. 149, 98 N.E. 2d 39 (1951).
30 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 24, supra.
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that the railroad should erect a single sign?3 1 It is true that the Ohio
couit has held that a failure to provide the statutory warning
sign is negligence per se.3 2 However, if an automobile is driven into
the side of a train which has pre-empted the crossing, -the negli-
gence of the railroad in failing to provide this statutory warning
sign is considered not to be the proximate cause of the accident.
The reason is that if the driver did not see a huge train completely
blocking the crossing, surely he would not have seen a small
railroad sign. Actually, the effect of the "pre-emption doctrine"
generally absolves the railroad from liability where the railroad
fails to provide any warning sign whatsoever. Consequently, where
the railroad company left a train stationary across a crossing at
night, with no light whatsoever, and did not provide any warning
signs with the result that an automobile crashed into the -train,
it was held that a guest in the automobile could not recover, since
the railroad was not negligent in failing to provide additional
warffings:33 While the Ohio Supreme Court at first flatly formu-
lated this doctrine of pre-emption with no explicit exception, later
decisions have indicated that there may be exceptional situations
where -his rule is inapplicable. If the crossing has features of
"unusual danger" or is "extraordinarly hazardous,' then it may
be the railroad's duty to provide additional warning devices even
though the train has pre-empted the crossing.3 4 Thus, where a
traveler drove into the side of a train which had pre-empted a
crossing within a populous municipality, the collision occurring at
night on a street which had a steep grade, an Ohio appellate court
has held that a jury question is presented.3 s
A further refinement to the doctrine of pre-emption is presented
by this interesting situation. Can the railroad be deemed legally
responsible for a collision occurring while it was violating a statute
limiting the time during which a crossing may be blocked? 36 Is
the violation of such a statute negligence per se When the traveler
collides with the train? The Ohio court has held it is not.3 7 The
basis of the decision is that the statute is not a safety statute;
rather the purpose of the statute is to expedite the free flow 6f
traffic on the highway. The traveler in such a situation is simply
31 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 24, supra; Canterbury v. Rd. Co.; 158
Ohio St. 68, 107 NX. 2d 115 (1952).32 Patterson v. Penna. Rd., see note 10, supra.
33 Canterbury v. Rd. Co., see note 31, supra; Reed v. Erie Rd., see niote 9,
supra.
34 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 24, supra,
3S Lscman v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 8, supra.
3 6 Omo RMV. CoD §5589.2L
37 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 24, supra.
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not within the ambit of the protection afforded by the statute.38
Yet, if the railroad's blocking of the crossing caused the traveler
loss through delay, the traveler can then come within the protec-
tion afforded by the statute.3 9
Finally, if the railroad does not give any warning but the
traveler already has knowledge of the train in sufficient time to
avoid any injury, then the traveler has not relied upon the neg-
ligent conduct of the railroad and his injury could not have occurred
as the proximate result of the railroad's negligence. 40
THE RAoLROAD's DUTY OF Lookout
Incumbent upon the engineer of a railroad train is the duty
to maintain a vigilant lookout on the track ahead of the train. Es-
sentially, the theoretical and pragmatic basis for the existence of
this duty is to secure protection on behalf of the train's passengers.4'
Since the engineer can only discharge this duty to his passengers by
keeping a strict lookout upon the track in front of the train, a
fortiori, the engineer cannot also at the same time have a duty to
look to both sides of the track;4 it follows that a railroad does
not owe a duty to constantly maintain a lookout for approaching
travelers not on the railroad right-of-way.
As to non-passenger third persons the engineer's standard of
care in maintaining a lookout upon the tracks is dependent upon
the character and classification of the person crossing the railroad
track. As to invitees on the railroad right-of-way, the engineer
owes the duty of reasonable care in maintaining a lookout upon
the track ahead. 43 However, the railroad does not owe a duty to
exercise ordinary care in maintaining a lookout for licensees and
trespassers. It is said that in the absence of an implication of con-
sent through custom and usage" the railroad does not owe a "duty
of active vigilance to especially look" for licensees and trespass-
ers.
4s While it may be simply stated that the railroad owes to in-
38 Capelle v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 24, supra. This result was not
reached without conflict. Short v. Penna. Rd., 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N.E. 737
(1933).
396 Owro Sr. L.J. 234 (1940).
40 Yeazil v. L & N. Ry., 13 Ohio App. 499 (1921).
41 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Higgs v. N.Y.C. Rd., 57
Ohio App. 37, 14 N.E. 2d 32 (1937).
42 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Haugh v. Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton Ry., see note 14 supra.
43 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Blanchet v. Cuyahoga Valley
Rd., 62 Ohio . Abs. 272, 107 NE. 2d 142 (1951).
44B. & I. R.R. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399 (1868); Smith v. Pittsburgh &
W. Ry., 90 Fed. 783 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1898).
45Railway v. Workman, 66 Ohio St. 509, 64 NE. 582 (1902); Carter v.
Erie R.R., 14 Ohio Cir. Ct (N.S.) 108 (191).
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vitees the duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining a look-
out upon the tracks, the application of this rule has not met with
such facile construction. Thus, an Ohio appellate court has held
that circumstances may be such that as a matter of law the rail-
road is not negligent in failing to see, in broad daylight, in invitee
- a small child - upon its tracks. 46 Yet, another appellate case
has held that a jury question was presented when a larger object
- a stalled automobile - was not discerned by the railroad.47
Further, even assuming that the railroad is negligent in not pro-
viding a lookout, the evidence must affirmatively establish that
the railroad's failure to keep a lookout was the proximate cause
of the injury to the invitee. If the evidence does not show that the
invitee on the track was in a position where he could or should have
been seen, then the Ohio courts have held that mere conjecture as
to casual relationship is insufficient to predicate liability. 8
Yet if, perchance, the railroad does in fact see the party upon
the railroad track, then irrespective of whether the party be in-
vitee, licensee or trespasser, the railroad owes him the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care. Even though the plaintiff is contributorily
negligent, a negligent railroad defendant may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be held liable; this doctrine is commonly termed "last
clear chance."49 While the Ohio court first held that constructive
knowledge of the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain the doctrine of
last clear chance S0 the present view is unequivocable that actual
knowledge of the plaintiff is necessary before the doctrine of last
clear chance can be properly invoked.s l However, not only must
the railroad actually have knowledge of a third party, but the rail-
road must have had a reasonable opportunity to avoid the acci-
dent after acquiring knowledge.s 2 In Ohio, the theoretical rationale
of this doctrine is that the plaintiff's antecedent negligence is mere-
ly a condition, while the defendant's subsequent negligence is
termed the actual proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
An Ohio Court of Appeals has provided a most provocative
and potentially significant decision in this area.5 3 The court in
46 Penna. Rd. v. Milleson, 51 Ohio App. 528, 2 N.E. 2d 17 (1935).
47 iggs v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 41, supra.48 Blanchet v. Cuyahoga Valley R.R., see note 43, supra.
49 Erie R.R. v. McCormick, 69 Ohio St. 45, 68 N.E. 571 (1903); Cole v.
N.Y.C. Rd., 150 Ohio St. 175, 80 N.E. 2d 854 (1948); Schaaf v. Coen, 131 Ohio
St. 279, 2 N.E. 2d 605 (1936).
SO Railroad Company v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St 230, 31 N.E. 282 (1892).
51 Cole v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 49, supra; Ross v. Hocking Valley Ry., 40
Ohio App. 447, 178 N.E. 852 (1931.)
S2 Cole v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 49, supra; Schaaf v. Coen, see note 49, supra;
Farmer v. P.C.C. & St. T. Ry., 83 Ohio App. 321, 80 N.E. 24 177 (1947); Hay-
man v. Penna. Rd., 77 Ohio App. 135, 62 N.E. 2d 724 (1945).
S3 In this case, the defendant railroad operated its train with faulty
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the Meredith case was not particularly certain whether antecedent
negligence by both parties would preclude the doctrine of last clear
chance; assuming such to be the case however, the court said
that it would term the negligence of a railroad in failing to pro-
vide proper brakes as an "existing negligence" rather than as
antecedent negligence. The court said to hold otherwise "would
under such working of that rule free all railroads from any liability
while operating in violation of air brake requirements." The
court's argument fails to properly evaluate and consider all rele-
vant criteria of liability. First of all, the court ignores the fact that
the doctrine of last clear chance can be applicable only where
plaintiff is contributorily negligent.5 4 In the second place, the court
does not deny that if defendant did not see plaintiff the doctrine of
last clear chance would be inapplicable. Thus, the court's supos-
ititious "all or nothing at all" reasoning cannot be supported by
established rules of tort liability. In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court
has defined the doctrine as applying only where the injury could
have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care after the de-
fendant actually had notice.5s Yet, in the Meredith case, plaintiff's
injury could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable
care after defendant had notice. Actually, it was "impossible"
for defendant to avoid the accident after it acquired knowledge of
plaintiff. It is submitted that the test as presently stated by the
Ohio Supreme Court would in all probability require a result
contra to the Meredith case. Certainly, to twist antecedent negli-
gence into the fiction of continuing negligence is to drain the present
rule of its meaning and vitality.
Practically speaking, it is particularly difficult to establish
negligence on the part of the railroad in failing to comply with its
standard of care under the doctrine of last clear chance. The
following are some mitigating ajudicative principles which have
considerably vitiated the use of this doctrine: In order to invoke
the last clear chance, the elements of this doctrine must be affirma-
brakes in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The railroad engi-
neer saw plaintiff upon its tracks and, acting reasonably, applied his brakes
which were inoperative. Plaintiff asserted the doctrine of last clear chance.
Defendant railroad argued that it never did have a last clear chance since
after it acquired knowledge of plaintiff's position, it had acted reasonably and
its negligence was antecedent to its alleged last clear chance. Fairport P. &
E. Ry. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934).
S4 Schaaf v. Coen, see note 49, supra.
55 Cole v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 49, supra; Schaaf v. Coen, see note 49, supra.
Although the Meredith case could perhaps be distinguished on the basis that
the policy underlying the federal act required strict compliance by the rail-
road.
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tively alleged in the petition or complaint;56 moreover, it is said
that the engineer owes the highest standard of care to his passengers
while owing only ordinary care to third persons; S7 the standard
of care applicable to the engineer being the standard of care of
a reasonable man in such an emergency;58 generally, it is not negli-
gent for the engineer to assume that an approaching third party will
stop if under the circumstances the third party would reasonably be
put on notice of the train;59 if the defendant reasonably feels that by
a warning, the third party will move from his position of peril,
then the defendant is justified in not slowing down; 60 actually,
even if it is shown that the defendant saw the plaintiff, the court
has held that the defendant acted reasonably whether he increased
or decreased the speed of the train. 61
TnE DUTY oF THE RAIoAD AS TO SPEED
Generally, there is no statutory limitation upon the right of a
railroad to operate its trains in the open country at any speed
which the railroad thinks proper. Moreover, it is a well settled
Ohio judicial rule that the doctrine of reasonable care does not re-
quire a railroad to observe any set or particular speed limit in
the operation of its trains in the open country.62 In effect, a rail-
road is allowed to operate its train at unlimited speeds in the
open country as long as the speed is commensurate with the main-
tenance of safety to the railroad's passengers. Protection is afford-
ed to travelers at crossings by the railroad's observance of signals
and warnings. 63 Perhaps another basis for judicial cognizance of
this view may be found in the maxim that the burden of avoiding
a grade crossing collision rests for the most part upon the traveler
on the highway.64
Since there is no assured clear distance rule, either statutory
or judicial, applying to the operation of a train, the railroad when
approaching a grade crossing does not have to operate its train at
such a speed permitting it to stop and avoid the collision after the
56 Hayman v. Penna. Rd., see note 52, supra.
S7 Railway Co. v. Workman, see note 45, supra.
S8 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra.
S9H owever, the courts will not indulge in this presumption where the
train fails to comply with its duty to warn so that the traveler would not
reasonably be put on notice of the imminent approach of the train. Hunts-
man v. C. & 0. Ry., 82 Ohio App. 65, 80 NE. 2d 645 (1945).
60 Robinson v. Penna. Rd., 117 Ohio St. 43, 158 NXE. 83 (1927).
61 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra.
62 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Hicks v. B. & 0. Rd., see
note 5, supra; Carter v. Penna. Rd., see note 5, supra.63 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Carter v. Penna. Rd., see
note 5, supra.64 Woodworth v. Rd. Co., see note 16, supra; Railroad" Co. v. Kistler, see
note 16, supra.
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obstruction should have been seen by the railroad. 5
An important judicial exception has been engrafted upon the
general rule that a railroad may operate its train at any speed in
the open country. If a particular crossing is "extra-hazardous" or
"peculiarly dangerous," the railroad is not allowed to run its train
at any speed it thinks proper. Rather, the railroad must operate its
trains at a reasonable speed under the particular surrounding cir-
cumstances.6 6 The exact determination of a particularized rea-
sonable speed is a problem answered only by the vagaries of a jury.
Since a railroad is only allowed to operate its train at high
speeds on the basis that safety is secured to road travelers by
statutory signals, it follows a fortiori that the failure of the railroad
to give such warnings may justify the holding that, under such cir-
cumstances, the speed of the railroad was negligent.67 As we have
seen under the section, "Duty to Give Additional Warning," the
factors creating an extra-hazardous crossing cannot be predicted
with any marked assurance. Actually the same rules and decisions
in that section apply with equal force to the instant problem.
If a railroad engaged in interstate commerce operates its train.
with defective brakes in violation of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act with the result that the speed of the railroad train cannot be
properly controlled, the railroad is negligent per se.68 Unlike the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, the contributory negligence of
the traveler is available to the railroad as a defense.69 Further,
under Ohio Rev. Code § 723.48, the Ohio legislature has specific-
ally granted to municipalities the power to enact ordinances regu-
lating the speed of railroad trains within the municipalities' lim-
its, subject to the restriction, however, that "such ordinance shall
not require a rate of speed of less than 4 miles an hour and in vil-
lages having a population of 2,000 or less it shall not require a
rate of less than 8 miles an hour...1o70 Careful note must be made
that this statute makes the delegation of power dependent upon a
6 Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Baker v. N. & W. Ry., 88
Ohio App. 537, 100 N.E. 2d 649 (1951); Shaffer v. N.Y.C. Rd, 66 Ohio App.
417,34 NZ. 2d 792 (1940).
66Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra; Gibbins v. B. & 0. Rd., see
note 26, supra; Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Yeley, see note 17, supra.
67 Hicks v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 5, supra.
6845 U.S.C. §§ 1, 9.
69 Fairport P. & E. Rd. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934).
70 Omo R iv. CoD §723.48. "The legislative authority of a municipal
corporation may, when a railroad track is laid in the municipal corpora-
tion, by ordinance, regulate the speed of all locomotives and railroad cars
within the municipal corporation limits. Such ordinance shall not require a
rate of speed of less than 4 miles an hour, and in villages having a population
of 2,0 or less, it shall not require a rate of less than 8 miles an hour.. :'
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classification of population; to-wit: a population of 2,000. It is sub-
mitted, perhaps boldly, that this statute does not meet the prerequi-
site constitutional requirements presently existing under Ohio law.7'
Municipalities of Ohio have quite commonly enacted ordinances
regulating the speed of railroads within the municipal limits. It is
not infrequent for municipalities to set speed limits at 4, 8, 12, 16,
20 ad infinitum miles per hour. As might be expected these or-
dinances have been frequently attacked on a constitutional level.
The propriety of such an attack was expressly approved long ago.72
Some statutes have stood firm against the constitutional attack;
many have fallen. 73 Each ordinance is peculiarly dependent upon
the individual facts and circumstances existing in the municipality.74
The principal constitutional modes of attack have been predicated
upon the argument that the ordinances constitute an undue burden
on interstate commerce or that the prescribed speeds are so in-
ordinately low as to bear no substantial relationship between the
public safety and the particular speed limit.
The Ohio General Assembly has not only passed an enabling
provision providing for regulation of any excessive speed of rail-
road trains, but it has also passed a statute to increase the speedy
flow of railroad traffic. Ohio Rev. Code § 559.821 prohibits any un-
necessary obstruction by locomotive and cars of a crossing for
longer than 5 minutes. The gravamen of the above mentioned
statute is contained in the language "unnecessary obstruction."
Merely because the railroad blocks a crossing for a period longer
than 5 minutes does not in itself constitute a violation of the statute.
A further showing must be made that the obstruction was "un-
necessary." 75 As has been mentioned before, violation of this sec-
71 The Ohio Supreme Court has unequivocably held that there can be no
subclassification of municipalities in respect to state legislation except on the
basis of 5,000 population-the constitutional classification separating cities
and villages. In City of Elriah v. Vandenmark, 100 Ohio St. 365, 126 N.E.
314 (1919), the Ohio Supreme Court succinctly stated: "It having been de-
lared by the constitution that the municipalities of the state should be
classified upon the basis of cities and villages, it must be presumed that it is
intended that there should be no further classification for the purpose of
legislation affecting municipal government." This constitutional precept has
not been subsequently altered, modified or changed and has been recently
explicitly re-affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court: Sawyer v. Cincinnati,
157 Ohio St. 515, 106 N.. 2d 286 (1952); see City of Mansfield v. Endly, 38
Ohio App. 528, 176 N.E. 462 (1931); Mallison, General Versus Special Statutes
in Ohio, 11 Oaro ST. L.J. 462 (1950).
72 Toledo C. & 0. Rd. v. Miller, 108 Ohio St. 388, 140 NE. 617 (1923).
73 For example, Weiler v. Penna. Rd., 34 Ohio L. Abs. 483, 28 N.E. 2d 792
(1939).
74 Toledo C. & 0. Rd. v. Miller, see note 72, supra.
7S Cincinnati v. Luckey, 153 Ohio St. 247, 91 N.E. 2d 477 (1950).
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tion does not confer a benefit to travelers except where there has
been a loss due to a delay in travel. 76 The protection afforded by
this statute falls short of applying to railroad crossing collisions.
It is unconstitutional for a municipality to enact an ordinance
which is in direct conflict with this statute. It has been held that
an ordinance which absolutely prohibits a railroad from blocking
a highway in the city for longer than 10 minutes is unconstitutional
as being unreasonable. The court's reasoning is that the temporal
restriction was so fixed as to disallow reasonable contingencies
beyond the control of the railroad.7 7 Finally, throughout this sec-
tion, it must be kept in mind that if the traveler conducted his
activity so that the excess speed of the railroad was not a causal
factor in precipitating the collision, then the excess speed of the
railroad is not the proximate cause of the accident.78
DUTY OF A TRAVELER
DuTY OF THE OPERATOR OF A VEHICLE
The rule, so "oft said" as to become trite, is well settled that
an operator of a vehicle has the duty to look and listen at a railroad
crossing. Depending upon the circumstances, it may be necessary
for the operator to stop.79 If a particular crossing is such that a
reasonable person would not be put on notice of the presence of
the crossing, then no duty to look and listen would arise." How-
ever, the operator is contributorily negligent as a matter of law
in failing to stop if a train has already pre-empted the crossing.
The presence of unfavorable atmospheric conditions reducing a
clear view will not alter this rule.8' The negligence of the traveler
is not predicated upon any failure to look and listen for approach-
ing railroad trains, but it is said to be founded upon the failure
of the traveler to maintain an assured clear distance. 82 If the rail-
road has not placed any extra-statutory signals (electric warning
devices, gates,, or watchmen) at a crossing, then the rule is quite
clear that the traveler must exercise his sense of sight and hearing
in such a manner as to be effective. Stated in different terms, the
traveler must look and listen from the last place where he could
76 6 OmIo ST. L.J. 234 (1940).
77 Cincinnati v. Luckey, see note 75, supra.
78 Clark v. B. & 0. Rd., see note 22, supra; Lynch v. Penna. Rd., 48 Ohio
App. 295, 194 N. 31 (1934).
79B. & 0. Rd. v. Davidson, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 406 (1935).
80 Thus, if the railroad fails to mark a crossing with signs and the cross.
ing is situated in such a manner as not to be reasonably discernible, the duty
to look and listen would be inapplicable. Zirkoff v. Penna. Rd., 86 Ohio App.
84, 90 N.-. 2d 148 (1948).
91 Reed v. Erie Rd., 134 Ohio St. 31, 15 N. 2d 637 (1938); Toledo Rd. v.
Hughes, 115 Ohio St. 562, 154 N.E. 916 (1926).
8 2 Skinner v. Penna. Rd. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933); Pat-
ton v. Penna. Rd., see note 5, supra.
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avoid injury.8 3 This locus would be just before going onto the track
or far enough away that the traveler could cross the track in safety
from that particular point; or if after starting across the tracks,
the traveler could by the exercise of ordinary caution avoid the
accident, this is then the place of effective looking. For example,
if the driver can ascertain whether the track is clear without bring-
ing the vehicle to a stop, then he has no duty to stop.84 Yet, if a
clear view of the track can only be made possible by stopping,
then such action is mandatory as a matter of law.85 However, the
mere fact that the traveler did stop, look and listen will not dis-
charge his duty if the exercise of looking and listening was not
made from a point where it would have been effective.86 For in-
stance, the Ohio courts have held that where the crossing is ob-
structed, a traveler can be negligent as a matter of law where he
looks in both directions from a distance of 60 feet,81 10 feet,88 and
5 to 10 feet,8 9 whether the traveler stops or not; of course, each
case depends upon its own peculiar facts. Suppose a clear view can-
not be obtained even by stopping the vehicle; a further problem
then arises as to whether the traveler owes a duty to leave his
vehicle and look up and down the track. Due to a paucity of Ohio
authority, the question cannot be resolved with any degree of con-
fidence. Numerous Ohio federal court decisions prior to 1938 held
that the traveler did in fact have the duty to leave his vehicle and
look for a train where a clear view could not otherwise be ob-
tained.90 A recent federal case has intimated that perhaps such a
rule might be properly invoked by the Ohio judiciary.9 ' However,
an Ohio Court of Appeals has said that a jury question is pre-
sented on the issue of ordinary care where the driver could not
have time to re-enter his vehicle and safely drive across the right-
of-way even if he emerged from his automobile and looked up and
down the right-of-way.92
83 Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St. 493, 151 NX.. 714
(1926); Penna. Rd. v. Rusynik, 117 Ohio St. 530, 159 NXE. 826 (1927); Lang
V. Penna. Rd., 59 Ohio App. 345,18 N.E. 2d 271 (1938); B. & 0. Rd. v. Joseph,
112 F. 2d 518 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied 300 U.S. 682 (1941).
84B. &. 0. Rd. v. Davidson, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 406 (1935).
85 B. & 0. Rd; v. Davidson, see note 84, supra; Traction Co. v. Smith, 23
Ohio Cir. Ct 610 (1912).
86 Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Rohrs, see note 83, upr- N.Y.C. Rd. v.
Quillan, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 524 (1933).
87 Burnett v. Erie Rd., 39 Ohio L. Abs. 621 (1944).
88 Price v. N.Y.C. Rd., 91 F. Supp. 898 (ND. Ohio 1950).
89 Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Yeley, see note 17, supre.
90 B,.& 0. Rd. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Leuthold v. Penna. Rd.,
33 F. 2d 758 (6th Cir. 1929).
91 Burnett v. Erie Rd., see note 87, -upra..
92 B. & 0. Rd. v. Metz, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 301 (1927).
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Innumerable mitigating factors have been advanced in an at-
tempt to modify the rule that the operator must look and listen
from a point wherein the exercise of the traveler's faculties could
be effective. The mere fact that the traveler testifies that he did
stop, look and listen does not necessarily present a jury issue.
Under what has been termed the doctrine of uncontrovertible
facts, a court will disregard the testimony of the traveler as having
no probative value where if the traveler had looked and listened
in a reasonable manner the collision could not have occurred. 93
Another purported legal excuse is presented when the streets were
in such a slippery condition that it was allegedly impossible for
the traveler to stop his vehicle short of the known crossing. While
such an argument might perhaps have some validity in certain
circumstances, the excuse has been held to be nugatory as a mat-
ter of law where the traveler slid 25 feet on an oily street into a
train.94 The traveler must keep the car under control and his oper-
ation in keeping his vehicle under control will be dependent on the
condition of the street.
Another justification for failing to discern an approaching
train is premised on the basis that the view of the right-of-way
was obstructed. Temporary obstructions such as smoke, steam or
passing trains do not justify driving a vehicle onto the railroad
track The traveler must wait until such temporary obstructions
cease. Failure to wait under such conditions constitutes negligence
as a matter of law.9 5 However, if the steam or smoke is not
momentary, but is continuous, the traveler may be justified in
proceeding across the right-of-way.96 It is not an excuse for an
operator to fail to see an approaching train where he would be
required to have turned his head to the side and rear 1300 to make
his looking effective.9 7 Nor is an obstruction caused by a passenger
in the front seat a legal excuse for failing to discern the train."
Innumerable times a traveler will maintain that it was impossible
for him to see an approaching train because of the limited visibility
due to fog, sleet, rain, snow and other atmospheric conditions. The
Ohio courts have embraced this justification with something less
than zealous fervor. When the danger is increased, the courts with
marked unanimity impose a greater care and caution on the travel-
93 Patton v. Penna. Rd., see note 5, supra; Continental Baking Co. v. Rd.
Co., 87 Ohio App. 505 (1950); Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. v. Rohrs, see note
83, sulpra; N.Y.C. Rd. v. Quillan, see note 86, supra,
94 Lynch v. Penna. Rd., 48 Ohio App. 295, 194 N.E. 31 (1934).
9S Penna. Rd. v. Rusynik, see note 83, supra; Eschenbach v. Hines, 23
Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 255 (1I21).
96 Biery v. Rd. Co., 156 Ohio St. 75, 99 N.E. 2d 895 (1951).
97 Price' v. N.Y.C. Rd., see note 88, supra.
98IbM.
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er.9 9 Thus, the mere fact that visibility is reduced to a few feet
because of fog does not in itself legally justify the driving of the
vehicle onto the track into the path of an oncoming train.'00 In
such a situation, it is incumbent upon the operator to exercise with
greater diligence his duty of listening and looking. Where a train on
a dark snowy night, operating without headlights, approached a
crossing whose view was obstructed, the traveler still had a duty
to listen. Moreover, the fact that the traveler testified that he did
not "hear the train is not sufficient to establish that he listened
in a manner which would make such listening effective where
there is positive evidence adduced that the train whistle was
sounded."'' Even in relatively similar circumstances where the
train whistle was not sounded, it has been held that if the traveler
listened he must have heard the noise of the train. The court took
judicial cognizance of the fact that a train makes a great amount
of noise. So even where no evidence was introduced as to the ef-
fectiveness of listening, the court might well assume that the travel-
er could have heard the train. 0 2 However, under relatively similar
circumstances where additional positive evidence is adduced to the
effect that there were distracting noises0 3 or there was a high wind
blowing, 0 4 which would make it exceedingly difficult to hear an
approaching train, a jury question is presented as to whether the
traveler exercised reasonable care. It would seem then that where
weather conditions substantially reduce visibility the traveler may
well be held negligent as a matter of law in proceeding across a
known railroad track except where special circumstances exist as,
for example, where the train, proceeding through the darkness
without lights fails to whistle and surrounding conditions could
drown out the noise of the train, or where the circumstances are
such that the traveler could have become reasonably confused. If
there are more permanent obstructions to the view of a right-of-
way, as buildings and standing trains, then again the traveler has
a greater duty to look and listen. Permanent physical obstructions
of view do not legally justify driving onto the track where it is
possible to exercise the faculties of sight and hearing just before
going onto the track which would enable the traveler to hear or
perceive the train. 0 5 Where the view is obstructed before going
99 B. & 0. Rd. v. McClellan, 69 Ohio St. 142, 68 N. 816 (1903); Bowman v.
B. & 0. Rd., 86 Ohio App. 129, 90 NY. 2d 390 (1949).
100ummins v. Erie Rd., 63 F. 2d 816 (6th Cir. 1933); Toledo Terminal
Rd. v. Hughes, 115 Ohio St 562, 154 N.E. 916 (1926).
101 Continental Baking Co. v. Rd. Co., see note 93, supra.
102 Patton v. Penna. Rd., see note 5, supra.
103 N.Y.C. & St I Rd. v. Van Dorp, 36 Ohio App. 530, 173 NY 445 (1930).
104 Zirkoff v. Penna. Rd., 86 Ohio App. 84, 90 NX. 2d 148 (1948).
105 C.C.C. & L Ry. v. Elliott, 28 Ohio St 340 (1876). 1 ..
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across several tracks and the traveler starts across, there is a con-
tinuing duty to look and listen, and if the view then becomes un-
obstructed so that the traveler may avoid a collision, the prior ob-
structions to his view do not constitute an excuse. It is improper
for the traveler to devote his entire attention to operating the ve-
hicle across the track.10 Therefore, if the railroad produces evi-
dence to show that it was possible for a traveler to have looked
and listened and in so doing, to have avoided the accident, then the
traveler is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, even though he
positively testifies that he looked and listened in an effective man-
ner. However, it may be possible to avoid the incidence of this
well settled rule where circumstances are such that the traveler
could have reasonably been confused or placed in a position of
emergency, or where the traveler could not reasonably know of
the crossing.
What if the railroad places extra-statutory warnings at the
crossing such as automatic gates, electric blinkers or a watchman?
What effect will such additional measures have upon the standard
of care of the traveler?
Ohio Rev. Code § 4611.62 makes it unlawful for a traveler to
proceed over a crossing when automatic lights are blinking, auto-
matic gates are closed or a watchman signals for the traveler to
stop. Violation of this section has been construed to make the
traveler negligent per se.10 7 An interesting problem is presented
where the traveler seeks to avoid the incidence of this statute by
averring that it was impossible for him to stop at the crossing. The
Ohio Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of a legal ex-
cuse to avoid the incidence of a safety statute. However, the court
has not displayed any discernible solicitude toward its application.
The traveler must show that the failure to comply with the statute
was caused by something over which the driver had no control,
an emergency not of the driver's making causing failure to obey
the statute and something that would make it impossible to comply
with the statute. 08 The extent to which a legal excuse for the
violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4611.62 may be recognized is pres-
ently a matter of speculative conjecture.
A problem which has created immeasurable confusion and in-
consistency in the Ohio law arises when the extra statutory pro-
tection fails. Suppose, due to mechanical difficulties, an electric
blinker fails to inform the traveler of the imminent approach of a
fast moving train. Suppose the automatic gates are open when the
106 Eschenbach v. Hines, see note 95, supra.
107 Brown v. Penna. Rd., 76 Ohio App. 171, 61 NE. 2d 163 (1945); Penna.
Rd. v. Folger, 170 F. 2d 238 (6th Cir. 1940).
108 Bush V. Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E. 2d 851 (194).
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traveler arrives at the crossing, but an express train is but a few
hundred yards away. What would be the result if a watchman
oversleeps and fails to signal the approach of the train or, worse
yet, the watchman signals the passenger to cross the track when
the train is roaring close to the crossing? The Ohio Supreme Court
has adopted two divergent and conflicting rules pertinent to this
area. In the 19th century, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
traveler may place some reliance upon the safeguard afforded by
the extra-statutory protection. It was held that the lack of warning
from extra-statutory devices constitutes an invitation to cross. The
traveler, however, under this view still is burdened by the duty
to look and listen in a "reasonable manner.' u ° 9 This rule was
ostensibly followed over a period of time. In 1931, the Ohio Su-
preme Court1 ° held that extra-statutory signals are merely meant
as warnings, not as an invitation to cross. The syllabus of the case
said that the traveler must look and listen from a point sufficiently
distant from the track to halt his vehicle and thereby prevent the
collision. The actual effect of this case is to make no distinction
as to whether the crossing is or is not protected by extra-statutory
signals, insofar as affecting the duty of a traveler to exercise rea-
sonable care. A subsequent Supreme Court decision has at least
inferentially conflicted with this case.'11 The Ohio Supreme Court
in 1951 expressly recognized the conflict.1 2 However, the facts of
that 1951 case were insufficient to render a distinct holding in
resolution of this conflict. The 1951 case impliedly indicated a prob-
able tendency to follow the rule that the extra-statutory signal
was an invitation to cross the track and not merely a warning.1 3
In any event, under either view the traveler is not absolved from
all duty to look and listen merely because the extra-statutory
warning is not givei. If we follow the rule which probably exists
in Ohio today, then the extent to which a traveler must exercise
this duty is of course a question dependent entirely upon the
peculiar facts existing at each individual crossing. The following
decisions point up the contrast and the confused language existing
in the Ohio law on this question-: Where the traveler does not look
or listen until he sees he cannot stop, it has been held that he is
negligent as a matter of law even though automatic signals are not
working;" 4 the traveler must exercise his faculties of hearing and
sight at a sufficient distance from the track to enable him to stop
and avoid the accident and his failure will render him contributori-
109 Railway Co. v. Schneider, see note 16, supra.
110 C. D. & M. Elec. Co. v. O'Day, 123 Ohio St. 638, 176 NXE 569 (1931).
111 Lohrey v. B. & 0. Rd., 131 Ohio St. 386, 3 N.E. 2d 54 (1936).
1 2 Tanzi v. Rd. Co., 155 Ohio St. 149, 98 NX. 2d 39 (1951).
"1 Id. at 157, 98 N.M. 2d at 43.
114 C. D. & M. Elec. Co. w O'Day, 123 Ohio St. 638, 176 NX. 569 (1930).
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ly negligent as a matter of law even though automatic devices were
inoperative." 5 A dictum has been stated that "we can readily say
that had the warning sign at this particular crossing been an auto-
matic signal, its failure to operate might not have constituted an
implied invitation to cross.""(' Contrast the language of the above-
mentioned decisions with the following: Where the railroad was
negligent in failing to give a whistle and where both a watchman
and an automatic gate failed to indicate the approach of a train,
the traveler is not negligent as a matter of law in proceeding over
the crossing." 7 The traveler may rely upon automatic blinkers
and is not contributorily negligent if under the circumstances he
exercised reasonable care.118 A jury question is presented as rea-
sonable minds might well differ." 9
Reasonable conduct of the traveler is dependent upon the type
of extra-statutory signal adopted by the railroad. If the crossing
is protected by a watchman and the traveler is unaware of this
situation, the fact that the watchman fails to appear to give a warn-
ing cannot alter the traveler's standard of care;1 20 the traveler must
look and listen and if necessary, stop, in the same manner as if
there were no extra-statutory signal located at that particular
crossing. If, however, the operator of the vehicle is cognizant of the
practice of the railroad to give warning at this crossing through a
watchman, then the traveler may rely upon the absence of the
watchman as an indication that the right-of-way is free from ap-
proaching trains.12 1 This distinction as to watchmen would be in-
applicable to automatic flashers and gates, since an automatic
flasher or gate would be readily visible to all travelers. A traveler
may place greater reliance upon a watchman, standing in clear
view, who fails to warn of the approach of the train than upon
an automatic signal device which indicated the track is clear. The
rationale being that it is far more plausible for a mechanical de-
vice to break down, than it would be for a watchman to fail to see
a large oncoming train.122
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that even though an extra-
statutory warning is inoperative, the traveler must still exercise
usPenna. Rd. v. Tice, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 322 (1934).
116 However, this same court has held that a distinction must be made be-
tween inactive conduct of a watchman and inactive operation of mechanical
signal devices. Thomas v. Penna. Rd., 70 Ohio App. 191, 200, 45 N.E 2d 776,
780 (1942).
117 Kasly v. B. & 0. Rd., 23 Ohio App. 185, 155 N.E. 174 (1926).
118 Toledo Term. Rd. v. Hughes, see note 81, supra.
119 N. Truck Line Co. v. WL.E. Ry., 77 Ohio App. 253, 66 N.E. 2d 782 (1945).
120 Tanzi v. Rd., see note 112, supra.
121 Ibid.
122 Filkosky v. Penna. Rd., 78 Ohio App. 280, 69 N.. 2d 660 (1946).
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"due care" while in the process of crossing the track. Accordingly,
the court has said that if a crossing is protected by gates and the
operator of a vehicle starts across a crossing while the gates are
open but in the process of crossing, the gates close, the traveler
will be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not
then looking for the train. 123
In conclusion, it might be said that the law shaping the ve-
hicular driver's standard of care at a railroad crossing is not only
at times confusing but seemingly inequitable. The philosophy of
the courts of Ohio may perhaps be accurately exemplified by the
following statement of judicial policy: "In this age of numerous
and often speedy motor vehicles on the highways, our courts are
not inclined by their judgments to encourage highway travelers
to engage in a race with death at railroad grade crossing.1'
DuTY OF A PASSENGER IN A VEHICLE
The problem herein presented concerns itself with the standard
of care applicable to a passenger in a vehicle when approaching
and crossing a railroad intersection. In the absence of an agency
relationship, the negligence of the operator is not imputed to the
passenger under Ohio law.125 Although a passenger has a lesser
duty than the driver to look and listen for dangers, the general
rule is said to be that a passenger is not entirely relieved of the
duty to look and listen for trains and to warn the driver thereof.
The test as to what particular action may or may not be required
of a passenger is contained in the magic words "reasonable care
under similar circumstances."' 26 While the words are explicit, their
application in a particular circumstance is not concomitantly lucid.
Text writers and cases have occasionally flatly stated that there
is an absolute duty for guests to look and listen at railroad cross-
ings and warn the driver of dangerous conditions.1 Such language
tends to equate the duties of vehicular passengers and operators.
It is submitted that such statements constitute a gross oversimplifi-
123 Lohrey v. B. & 0. Rd., 131 Ohio St. 386, 3 N.E. 2d 54 (1936).
124 Ballmer v. Penna. Rd., 59 Ohio App. 221, 228, 17 N.E. 2d 435, 438 (1938).
12S McLaughlin v. N.Y. Rd., 130 Ohio St 527, 200 N.E 757 (1936).
126 HLV. Ry. Co. v. Wyckle, 122 Ohio St 391, 171 N. 860 (1930); Toledo
Railways & Light Co. v. Mayers, 93 Ohio St 304, 112 N. 1014 (1916); B. & 0.
Rd. v. Brown, 36 Ohio App. 404, 173 N.. 298 (1929); Strider v. Penna. Rd.,
60 F. 2d 237 (6th Cir. 1932).
127 "Yet the guest is as much bound to look and listen for an approaching
train as the driver and may be guilty of contributory negligence in failing to
do so." 34 0. Ju. Railroads § 1170, citing an Ohio Supreme Court case where
the passenger had expressly assumed the driver's duty to listen; "Ohio cases
support the view that guests are required to look and listen at railroad
crossings and of course warn the driver of approaching trains at crossings
known to and perceivable by them and that is as it should be." Collins v.
Penna. Rd., 76 Ohio App. 115, 63 N.E. 2d 225 (1944) (dictum).
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cation of the Ohio law. We have seen that the Ohio courts have
rather rigidly and constantly held an operator to be negligent as
a matter of law in failing to look and listen. Yet when the legal
question concerns the alleged negligence of a guest, the Ohio cases
have, except in exceptional circumstances held that a jury question
is presented.128 Actually, the standards of care pertaining to guests
and operators are most distinct. It is not particularly difficult to
discern why the duties are not synonymous when, of necessity, the
following factors must be considered before a guest can be said
to be negligent in failing to discharge his duty to look, listen and
warn: The guest either must or should know of the railroad cross-
ing; if he does not, there is simply no duty to warn the driver.129
If the guest has knowledge of a particular crossing, it must be
further shown that the guest was in a position to observe the right-
of-way.130 Yet, assuming knowledge of the crossing and an ability
to discern the right-of-way, the guest, after exercising his duty of
looking and listening, must have had a reasonable time to inform
the driver of the approaching danger. 31 However, even assuming
that the guest had time to warn the driver of a known train, the
guest may still not be negligent in failing to so warn the driver. It
has been held that warning the driver or advising him what to do,
may, under certain circumstances, involve more danger than to
"maintain silence and not interfere.' 132 Small wonder that such a
paucity of decisions holding the passenger guilty of negligence as
a matter of law exists. Even though the vast majority of cases are
submitted to the jury, it has been sometimes held that the passenger
is negligent as a matter of law. A jury question is not presented if
a passenger, in a position both to see and hear the train, responds
in the negative when asked whether he does see or hear a train. 33
Reasonable minds cannot differ if the passenger alleges in his peti-
tion that he kept a constant lookout ahead, and the evidence sub-
sequently shows that the passenger had a reasonable opportunity
to see or hear the train; the passenger is negligent as a matter of
law.134 A relatively old case has held a passenger negligent as a
matter of law where he did not warn the driver to stop before
12811 V. Ry. v. Wyckle, see note 126, supra; see Huntsman v. C. & 0.
Ry., 82 Ohio App. 79, 87, 81 NY_. 2d 118, 122 (1947); Tyler v. H.V. Ry., 28 Ohio
App. 88, 162 N.E. 623 (1927); B. & 0. Rd. v. Joseph, 112 F. 2d 518 (6th Cir.
1940).
129 Keiner v. The Wheeling & Lake Erie Rd. Co., 34 Ohio App. 409, 171 N.E.
253 (1930).
130 Id. It is possible that a guest may be negligent in not being in a proper
position to maintain a lookout.
131 B. & 0. R&d. v. Brown, 36 Ohio App. 404, 173 N.E. 298 (1929).
132 bId.
133 See Knaff v. N.Y.C. Rd., 55 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 86 N.E. 2d 814 (1949).
134 Coleman v. N.Y.C. Rd. Co., 36 Ohio L. Abs. 241, 39 N.E. 2d 157 (1941).
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crossing a track obscured by temporary smoke and steam.'13 Such
a decision might be unable to withstand analytical scrutiny under
prevailing Ohio law. If a passenger expressly assumes the driver's
duty to listen for the approach of trains, the passenger then has
the same duty as would a driver insofar as there has been an as-
sumption of duty.136
Finally, it must be well remembered that the legal principles
and standards pertinent to passengers are not inflexible; they have
been enunciated by the judiciary in such a manner that if the facts
so require they are capable of great breadth and elasticity.
Earl E. Mayer, Jr.
CivIL PRoCEDURE - ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT - NEGLIGENCE IN
PROPERTY DAMAGE AND PERSONAL INJURY
Plaintiff brought a negligence action for personal injuries
against defendants (master and servant) arising from an inter-
section collision. The defendants' answers contained allegations of
general denial, contributory negligence, and the affirmative de-
fense of res judicata in that the present plaintiff had been ad-
judged negligent in a previous action. The plaintiff's reply in re-
gard to the new matter of res judicata was that the suit referred
to by the defendants had been a suit for property damages only
and was therefore not res judicata in the present action. The lower
courts ruled for the plaintiff. On appeal, held reversed. The princi-
ple of estoppel by judgment precluded the plaintiff from recovering
in the instant case. Mansker v. Dealers Transport Co., 160 Ohio St.
255, 116 N.E. 2d 3 (1953).
The lower courts, in holding that the previous suit for property
damages was not binding in the present suit, had relied on language
in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 337, 61 N.E. 2d 707, 716
(1945), which stated that "(a) n act of a defendant which might
not be regarded as an unreasonable risk as to plaintiff's property,
might well be considered an unreasonable risk as to his person."
The reversal of the lower courts' decisions in the principle case
makes it clear that the above quoted language in Vasu v. Kohlers,
Inc., supra, will not prevent the application of the principle of
estoppel by judgment to ordinary negligence actions such as the
principal case. The Supreme Court stated in the principal case at
160 Ohio St. 259, 116 N.E. 2d 6, "The fact that in the former case
damage to property was involved whereas in the present case injury
to the person is the subject of the action makes no difference; the
standards by which negligence is determined are the same :in both
instances."
13S Williams v. Railway Co., 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. (1917).
136Railroad Co. v. Kistler, see note 16, supra.
